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Inflation can be explained by various factors. The schools of
thoughts in Economics provide different theories in this
context. Classical school of thought considers inflation as an
outcome of monetary expansion and quantity theory of money
as an explanation for this. But the proper transmission mech-
anism in explaining the relationship is lacking. The Keynesians
emphasize demand side to be the major factor responsible in
explaining changes in the price level. The Monetarists hold
money supply as sole reason of inflation. However they did not
support proportionality concept which was presented by clas-
sical economists. Friedman is the biggest proponent of this
school of thought and regarded inflation everywhere is a* Corresponding author. Tel.: þ92 51 9248080.
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license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).monetary phenomena. Fiscalist school of thought is of the view
that when there is persistent increase in fiscal deficits then
governments opts for easiest choice of financing, monetization
of deficit, which will eventually raise price level.
The developing countries face is low level of revenue due to
structural bottlenecks like low tax base, tax evasion and
reduction in tax rates.2 However, deficits can be reduced either
by enhancing tax revenue or reducing expenditure. Keeping in
view the structural bottlenecks of developing countries,
borrowing from public banks is easy option to finance deficits.
If government finances budget deficits by selling government
bonds to public then budget deficits will not create any infla-
tion as no new money is created in the process. However, if
borrowing is made from banks then monetary deposits will
expand and causes inflation. (Dornbusch, Sturzenegger, Wolf,
Fischer, & Barro, 1990; Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1993;
Hamburger & Zwick, 1981).
Link between budget deficits, inflation and money supply
always remained critical issue. Budget deficits and inflation2 Tax evasion and tax administration cost is common feature of many
developing economies as sited by (Edwards and Tabellini, 1991).
ting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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exist about this link. First argument is based on rationale that
part of budget deficits financed by borrowing from central
bank leads to increase in money stock and higher money stock
causes inflation.3Conversely, in an un-utilized resource econ-
omy, high level of deficits may lead to higher demand which
raises output. Second argument embark that higher demand
due to large fiscal deficits will raise prices where output of
essential commodities cannot be increased.
In case of developed economies, ample empirical studies
showed that fiscal deficits do not exert inflationary pressure
(Blanchard and Fischer, 1989; Click, 1998; King and Plosser,
1985). While in case of developing economies, studies indi-
cated positive relationship between deficits and inflation.4
However studies like Dwyer (1982), Brown and Yousefi
(1996), Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou (1994) found insig-
nificant relationship. Empirical literature presents a hazel
picture on inflationary impact of deficits. So role of institution
must be considered while studying this relationship in order to
get clear picture of this phenomena.
Analysis of economic and political structure of economy is
very important while studying the link between fiscal deficits
and inflation. It was after Paldam (1987) work on political
factors responsible for inflation, literature got different
dimension to include development of financial structure and
freedom of central bank to study inflation dynamics. Both
factors are vital in analyzing the behavior of budget deficits
and inflation in economy. It is well established fact in litera-
ture that independent central banks serve as mitigating infla-
tion agents Cukierman (1992). Similarly, financial markets are
very important for economic development. Financial markets
are lending agents therefore they always support anti-
inflationary policies and independent institutions, like auton-
omous and independent central bank (Posen, 1993).
In developed economies, central bank can adopt inde-
pendent monetary policy for longer period without having
sustained fiscal deficits. While in developing economies,
financial sector is not fully developed and thus failed to grasp
its basic roots in economic structure. Along with fragile
financial sector, political pressure on central bank to mone-
tize deficits is also one of the main reasons of positive
relationship between fiscal deficits and inflation. Empirical
studies have shown that causality between deficit and infla-
tion run through money supply, if main source of financing is
seigniorage. But due to ambiguity in literature this study
attempts to elaborate the role of financial markets and central
bank independence to analyze inflationary effect of deficits
for selected Asian economies. For this purpose turnover rate
of governor (TOR) is used as a measure of central bank in-
dependence which is effective in measuring political pres-
sure on monetary authority, especially in case of developing
economies.3 See Olivera (1967) and Dutton (1971).
4 Metin (1995, 1998), Darrat (2000), Catao and Terrones (2005) and
Narayan and Seema (2006).Rest of the paper is organized as follow: Section 2 provides
brief literature review on the topic, in Section 3 theoretical and
empirical model is described, Section 4 explains econometric
techniques and description of variables, empirical findings are
discussed in Section 5 and final section concludes the paper.
2. Literature review
Vast and voluminous literature is available to explain
theoretical and empirical basis, for inflationary impact of
budget deficits. Both sides of coin were twisted and tossed by
literature and different results appeared. Mostly, studies con-
ducted for developing and emerging economies presented fact
that budget deficits are potential culprit of inflationary pres-
sure. But as far as most of developed nations are concerned
evidence of deficits being responsible for price hikes appeared
less significant. This study incorporated role of two major
institutional structures of economy and analyzed basic rela-
tionship between fiscal deficits and inflation. Literature review
is broadly categorized in two sections, theoretical and empir-
ical literature review.2.1. Theoretical literatureOn theoretical ground deficit and inflation link is widely
explored by Friedman (1968), Sargent and Wallace (1981);
and Miller (1983). Sargent and Wallace (1981) presented a
model where higher government deficits does not lead to
higher taxes; rather higher deficit or debt result in higher
money growth in current period or in future, and thus leads to
inflation. Dornbusch et al. (1990), asserted that in economies
where money creation is the only way to finance government
budget deficits then it become a principal determinant of
money growth and inflation. Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel
(1993) argued that money creation is cause of inflation.
Critics also held deficits responsible for crowding out phe-
nomena by affecting interest rate. When fiscal deficits are
financed by borrowing, demand for credit by government
increased and less is remained for private sector.
Theoretical basis for central bank independence is rooted in
concept of dynamic inconsistency of monetary policy under
case of discretion presented by Kydland and Prescott (1977). It
was explained that there is two way links between policy
makers and rational public regarding expectations about
inflation and employment. Monetary policy makers are keener
about price stability and employment level and desired level is
higher than natural level. Reasons behind this could be
distortion created by tax and labor union attitude toward real
wages. This requires desired rate to be set above market
clearing prices, that's creates further unemployment. Under
discretion, policy makers adopt the strategy of inflationary
surprise to raise employment level to desired level, but as
consumers are fully a-wear they exactly forecast expectations
against inflation. Consumer acquainted with fact, that there
will be no impact on employment, thus monetary policy result
in sub-optimal inflationary bias. To reduce this bias Rogoff
(1985) and Walsh (1995) presented two theories, which
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conservative toward inflation, than rest of the society. Two
important Theories for central bank independence are
conservative-central-banker approach of Kenneth Rogoff
(1985), and principal-agent approach of Carl Walsh (1995).
It is being asserted that institutional characteristics of central
bank have important effects on inflationary outcome and
ample empirical evidence is presented in this regard. Similarly
development of financial sector leads to growth is a well
establish fact. Financial sector development is positively
related to the growth as explored by Schumpeter (1911), Shaw
(1973), Levine (1997) and Singh (2007). Boyd, Levine, and
Smith (1996) are pioneers who investigated relationship be-
tween inflation and financial sector development.2.2. Empirical studiesInconsistent results were presented by literature on budget
deficits and inflation link. Many economists have given
proposition of no causal relationship between inflation and
deficits (see for example, Blinder, 1982; Friedman, 1981;
Grossman, 1982; Hamburger and Zwick, 1981; Hein, 1981;
Sprinkel, 1981; Weintraub, 1981). Most of the studies con-
ducted in developed economies failed to provide strong evi-
dence on inflationary effects of deficits. In a cross country
study Guess and Koford (1986) used granger casualty test, to
see are deficits really cause of inflation or recession in 17
OECD countries for data-set 1949 to 1981. Results indicate
deficits are not responsible for changes in recession, inflation
or crowding out phenomena of private investment. King and
Plosser's (1985) used VAR and single equation OLS model
to identify determinants of inflation for United States and 12
other countries, and did not found any empirical evidence on
causal relationship between deficit, money growth and infla-
tion. On empirical basis, Protopapadakis and Siegal (1987)
extended literature by empirically investigating relationship
between government deficit and money growth, for ten
industrialized economies namely Canada, Finland, France,
Germany, Holland, Japan, Italy, Switzerland, UK and USA for
period 1974e1983. Rank correlation test used for simple
estimation process and excess-money growth and excess debt
growth were concerned variables. Results showed no positive
association between government debt and money growth.
Argument was given that financial structure of economy is
responsible for such conclusion. Based on empirical evidence
of panel data (1980e2008) of seventeen European countries
including turkey, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Austria,
Belgium, Greece, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and England it
was indicated that generally no long run relation exists be-
tween inflation and budget deficits. Relationship changes
depending on developmental level and structural features of
economy (Sahan and Bektasoglu, 2010). This gave a rationale
that in order to examine inflationary impact of deficit it is
necessary to analyze the financial structure of economy.
While on other side empirical studies conducted in different
regions supports said hypothesis that deficits are inflationary.
provide support from panel as well as from country specificdata. Samimi (2000) and Samimi and Jamshidbaygi (2011)
focusing on relationship for Iranian economy strongly
confirmed positive relationship between budget deficits and
inflation. Metin (1998), €Ozatay (2000), Seljuk (2001), Tekin-
Koru and €Ozmen (2003) and Kia (2010) provided the empir-
ical evidence from Turkish economy that deficits and gov-
ernment debt remained important factors behind inflation
during different time spans. Evidence from African countries
was established by Onwioduokit (1999) and Chimobi and
Igwe (2010). Who explored relationship between deficit,
money and inflation for Nigerian economy during different
time period. Results indicate that deficits were responsible for
inflationary pressure in the Nigerian economy. For empirical
evidence Kilindo (1997) applied Aghevli and khan (1978)
self-generating model used to investigate relationship be-
tween deficit, money growth and inflation for Tanzanian
economy. Estimation results by OLS technique shows strong
relationship between fiscal deficits, money growth and infla-
tion in Tanzania. Ahmed and Suliman (2011) explored long
run relationship between money-supply, real GDP and price
level for economy of Sudan, using annual data for period
1960e2005. Lozano (2008) empirically tested relationship
between deficit, money growth and inflation by using three
different definition of money supply; Mo, M1, M3 for
Columbian economy for period 1981e2007. Empirical results
pinpoint that long run relationship exists between deficit,
money growth and inflation. Habibullah, Cheah, and Baharom
(2011), investigated relationship between budget deficits,
money growth and inflation for thirteen Asian countries
including Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippine, Myanmar,
Singapore, Thailand, India, South Korea, Pakistan, Srilanka,
Taiwan, Nepal and Bangladesh. Granger causality test and
Error correction model confirmed long run relationship exists
between deficits, money growth and inflation for time period
1950e1999. Dejtbamrong (2011) examined the impact of
Budget deficits on money-supply and output for the selected
sample of South East Asian Central Banks (SEACEN) coun-
tries, namely South-Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore,
Srilanka and Thailand for the period 1974-II to 1989-IV.
Empirical results based on reduced form equations of fiscal
and monetary policy showed mixed results. No impact of fiscal
policy on money supply in case of Korea and Philippines but
there exist strong relationship in case of Srilanka and
Singapore. Due to lack of strong capital market structure in
Srilanka and Singapore, fiscal variables can affect foreign
inflow of capital which may lead to increase in money supply.
Fischer (1995), using fixed effects for a panel of 94 developing
and developed economies, showed fiscal deficits are main
driver of high inflation (defined in excess of 100 percent a
year), and estimated that a 1 percentage point improvement
(deterioration) in the ratio of fiscal balance-to-GDP typically
leads to a 41/4 percent decline (rise) in inflation, if all else
remain constant. However, it was also concluded that changes
in budget balance have no significant inflationary effects in
low-inflation countries.
Till now we have seen both views on inflationary effects of
fiscal deficits without involvement of any institutional
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financial sector are two important institutional factors that can
be used to refine relationship between inflation and fiscal
deficits. Notable studies for central bank independence and
inflation are of Bade and Parkin (1988), Alesina (1988, 1989),
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), Eijffinger and
Schaling (1993), Alesina and Summers (1993). Different in-
dexes has been used to measure central bank independence
like Cukierman (1992) and Cukierman, Web, and Neyapti
(1992) used turnover rate of governors for developing coun-
tries to study the central bank independence. Higher the
turnover rate of governors, lower degree of freedom is enjoyed
by central bank. Independent central bank gives more power to
monetary authority to focus on its price stability motive with
freedom. Central bank independence has negative impact on
inflation as explored by Cukierman and Webb (1994) and
Brumm and Krashevski (2003), De Haan and Kooi (1997).
Loungani and sheets (1997) also found negative relationship
between inflation and CBI in cross-country analysis.
Review of literature give us broad picture of existing work
done in the area of budget deficits and inflation and what else
could be done to further refine this relationship. This study
will investigates inflationary effect of deficits under dependent
central bank and less developed financial markets.2.3. Theoretical and empirical modelTheoretical basis for model is taken from Neyapti (2003).
Where she asserted that most of developing countries relies on
seigniorage for financing fiscal deficits. So in period of time,
fraction of deficit is financed by mode of money creation,
which is negatively linked with central bank independence and
financial market development. So we can write
DMt ¼ mðGt  Tt þ rBt1Þ ¼ mDeft ð3:1Þ
Whereas 0 < m < 1 and m ¼ (lCBI or lFMD). lCBI and
lFMD, are lack of central bank independence and financial
market development and these are calculated on the inverted
scale for central bank independence and financial market
development indices. Lower value of m indicates that higher
degree of independence enjoyed by central bank, and financial
sector is more developed. If m takes value 0 it means that no
money accommodation is done for deficits and central bank is
fully independent and financial sector is fully developed so all
financing is done by debt issuing. On other hand if m is 1 then
central bank independence and financial market development
are at lowers values and all financing is done through money
creation mode.
General form of inflation function presented by Neyapti is
as follow
pt ¼ f ½AðLÞp;BðLÞDef ;CðLÞðmDef Þ;DðLÞgM;EðLÞgGDP
ð3:2Þ
Basic model for this study is established on the basis of
different existing studies. The specification of the econometricmodel is consistent with Neyapti (2003) and Aisen and Veiga
(2006).
Infit ¼ aInfi;t1 þXitbþ hi þ εi;t
i¼ 1…N; t ¼ 1…Ti ð3:3Þ
Here inf is inflation level of country i at time period t, a and
b are the parameters to be estimated and x is a vector consists
of all exogenous variables, hi is country specific effects and ε
is error term.
The model in extended form could be written as
Infit ¼ a0Infi;t1 þ a1Deficitit þ a2ExRateit þ a3Moneyit
þ a4gGDPit þ a5TORit þ a6FMDit þ hi þ eit
ð3:4Þ
Inf ¼ CPI inflation rate
Deficit ¼ fiscal deficit as percent of GDP,
gGDP ¼ growth rate of real GDP
Money ¼ M2 yearly growth.
TOR ¼ Turnover rate of central bank governors
ExRate ¼ Real Exchange rate
FMD: Financial Market Development
To see how budget deficits indirectly affect inflation
through money supply equation is simplified as
Infit ¼ a0Infi;t1 þ a1Deficitit þ a2gGDPit þ a3Moneyit
þ a4DFþ εit ð3:5Þ
εit ¼ hi þ eit
Here DF is dummy variable included in the Equation (3.5)
to see impact of financial crisis, 2008, on inflation rate for
selected countries. To see how central bank independence and
financial sector development help to explain inflationary
impact of deficits, in Equation (3.6) financial sector de-
terminants and CBI are used as interactive terms with budget
deficits. So we can write.
Infit ¼ a0Infi;t1 þ a1Deficitit þ a2½mDeficitit þ a3gGDPit
þ a4gMoneyit þ εit
ð3:6Þ
m shows the lack of central bank independence or lack of
financial sector development, denoted as lCBI, or lFMD, and
0 < m < 1. If m ¼ 0 it mean maximum independence enjoyed
by central bank and fully developed financial sector, and if
m ¼ 1 it mean lowest degree of independence enjoyed by
central bank and developed financial sector is less developed.
Developing economies are resource or revenue deficient and
have to borrow money through public. Thus they can either
monetize or accumulate debt by paying interest. In developing
economies at least some portion is assumed to be financed by
monetization process. m, in model 3.6 is representing that part
of budget deficits that is financed through money creation for
each period and m here is negatively associated with the degree
of central bank independence as well as financial sector
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used in “absence” form that is to see how less developed
financial markets and dependent central bank will affect the
inflationary pressure. Thus lack of financial sector develop-
ment is introduced with the budget deficits as interaction term
to see how less developed financial sector will affect deficits
and then how inflation would finally be affected. Individual
effects are captured by the first difference Generalized
Methods of Moments (GMM) and to capture regional effects
regional dummy was introduced. Prices are more volatile in
South Asia than in East Asian economies and to capture this
effect dummy of South Asia is introduced in Equation (3.7).
Infit ¼ a0Infi;t1 þa1Deficitit þ a2ðDeficit*FMDÞit
þ a3gMoneyit þ a4gGDPit þ a5DFit þ a6DSAsiait
þ εit
ð3:7Þ
Similarly to see how dependent central bank will effect
inflation, turnover rate of central bank governors is used as
proxy for central bank independence and TOR applied as
interaction term with deficits in Equation (3.8). Higher turn-
over rate shows that political interference is high and central
bank is not independent in following its targets.
Infit ¼ a0Infi;t1 þa1Deficitit þ a2ðDeficit*TORÞit
þ a3gGDPit þ a4gMoneyit þ a5DFit þ a6DSAsiait þ εit
ð3:8Þ
So final equation that is to be estimated with central bank
independence and financial sector development as interactive
term with budget deficits is as follows
Infit ¼ a0Infi;t1 þa1Deficitit þ a2ðDeficit*TORÞit
þ a3ðDeficit*FMDÞit þ a4gGDPit þ a5Moneyit
þ a5DFit þ a6DSAsiait þ εit ð3:9Þ
3. Econometric technique
Unit root test was applied to check stationarity of different
variables. Fisher and panel LevineLineChu (LLC) test
applied to all series to check stationarity conditions. Basic
equation of our model is
Infit ¼ aInfi;t1 þ bXit þ εi;t
i¼ 1…N; t ¼ 1…Ti ð4:1Þ
Lag of dependent variable is included in the model to
control for persistence in inflation and also to analyze impact
of previous period inflation on current inflation level. Tradi-
tional OLS technique for estimation gives inconsistent and
biased results due to dynamic specification (Greene,
2003:221). Causality may run between inflation and deficits
and between inflation and money supply so endogeneity may
also present in model due to correlation of explanatory vari-
ables with the error term (simultaneity biased). Instrumentalvariables are used to refine problem of endogeneity and to get
efficient estimates. IVLS, 2SLS/3SLS and GMM are proposed
techniques by literature for resolving problems of dynamic
models.
Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) is most appro-
priate technique for dynamic panel data as used in many
empirical studies (Rao, Tamazian, and Singh et al., 2009; Das
and Paul, 2011; Presbitero, 2006). Panel data combine both
cross-section and time series and allows us to see inflation and
deficits over long period of time for different Asian econo-
mies. Panel data some time employed to detect those dynamics
that cannot be detected in cross-sectional data. A country-
specific effect which occurs in panel can be controlled and
tackled using suitable and appropriate GMM techniques.
Sample period is quite large and possibility is there that var-
iables used for estimation procedure may be non-stationary. If
dependent variable is non-stationary then GMM will not be
appropriate technique.
Arellano and Bond introduced the concept of difference
GMM in 1991 to tackle the various problems raised in esti-
mation of dynamic panel model. Possible problems that are
suspected in dynamic panel are.
1. Endogeneity could emerge, due to feedback relation be-
tween deficit and inflation and money supply and inflation,
simultaneity biased, so in presence of endogeneity usual
OLS technique fails and give biased and inconsistent
estimates.
2. There may present country specific time invariant effects
(fix effects), such as demographics and geography which
may be correlated with regressor, fix effects are often part
of error term in equation one, which contain both unob-
served country specific effects hi, and observation specific
effects еit, εit ¼ hi þ еit.
3. Lag dependent variable, Infi, t1, present as regressor in
model, give rise to autocorrelation.
To tackle all these problems two stage least square method
can be applied but level variables used as instruments may
raise the problem of weak instruments. So Arellano and Bond
(1991) GMM method is more appropriate which not only uses
exogenous variables but also use lag levels of endogenous
variables as instruments. So now endogenous variables
become predetermined variables and remain no more corre-
lated with error term in above equation. To cope with second
problem GMM uses first difference so equations takes the
form
DInfit ¼ aDInfi;t1 þDbXit þDεit ð4:2Þ
Country specific effects removed after taking first differ-
ence of regressor because it is no more correlated to time. As
now
Dεit ¼ Dhi þDеit ð4:3:1Þ
εit  εi;t1 ¼ ðhi  hiÞ þ ðеit  еi;t1Þ ¼ еit  еi;t1 ð4:3:2Þ
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variables are used. The lag dependent variables will be less or
insignificantly correlated with error term as T increases.
However weak instrument still remain an issue and lag
levels can be poor instruments of first difference regressor. To
tackle this problem Blundell & Bond, 1998 proposed system
GMM and argued that weak instruments may produce biased
results and suggest extra conditions to be used to tackle this
problem.
4. Data description and analysis
Our empirical analysis is based on panel data covering time
period from 1981 to 2010 for eleven Asian economies including
Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Nepal,
Pakistan, Philippines, Srilanka, and Thailand. Initially fifteen
countries were chosen but due to missing data on some
important variables sample shrink to eleven countries. Partic-
ularly this time period was selected as a) financial liberalization
starts in 1980s in East Asian region and in late 1990s in southern
part of the Asia. But still central banks in selected countries are
not free and independent in its true sense and often face political
pressure in following its goals. b) Soaring fiscal deficits and
high inflation rates are important characteristics of selected
economies. For most of the variables, data is collected from
World Development Indicators (WDI), International Financial
Statistics (IFS), and World Economic Outlook (WEO). For
Central back independence, turnover rate of Governors (TOR)
is used as proxy and data is extracted from index developed by
Sturm, Jan-Egbert and Jakob de Haan (2001a, 2001b). Updated
data is taken from KOF Swiss Economic Institute website.5
Description of each variable is given in appendix however
construction of the most important variables is discussed below.4.1. Financial marketsDifferent measures are available in literature to see devel-
opment level of financial sector. However we employed pri-
vate sector credit to GDP and bank deposits. More provision of
credit to private sector shows less dependency of state/fiscal
authority on monetary or financial institutions, as more
involvement of private sector will make possible more avail-
ability of credit to the fiscal authority. For estimation proce-
dure private sector credit as percentage of GDP is used for
selected sample. This variable is also used by King and Levine
(1993), Boyd, Levine, and Smith (1996). Data on both vari-
ables is taken from World Development Indicators (WDI).
Basic objective is to use institutional variables in “absence/
lack” form that is to see what would happen to deficits and
inflation relationship if financial markets are not developed
and central bank is not independent, so for this purpose vari-
ables are normalized and inverted. Each institutional variable
before multiplying it with the deficit variable is normalized
between 0 and 1 on inverted scale. Variable now takes values 15 https://www.kof.ethz.ch/en/indicators/data-central-bank-governors/.to show complete lack of central bank independence or
financial market are not developed (CBI ¼ 0, FMD ¼ 0; it
implies LCBI ¼ 1 and LFMD ¼ 1), when variable takes value
0 it shows fully independent central bank and developed
financial markets (CBI ¼ 1 and FMD ¼ 1; it implies LCBI ¼ 0
and LFMD ¼ 0). Basic objective for normalization process is
to convert index to takes value either 1 or 0 and after
normalization index is inverted such that 1 means complete
lack of central bank independence or less developed financial
market. The normalization process is as follows.
To normalize private sector credit, between 0 and 1, each
value of the variable is divided by the maximum value it takes
in whole sample. To invert scale, such that one means com-
plete lack of financial development, subtract the resulting
variable from 1. Subtracting resultant series from its maximum
value such that new series becomes equal to one; that shows
lack of financial sector development.6 Normalization and
inversion process is done by method given in detail in Neyapti
(2003).
FMD¼ ½1 ðFMDi=FMDmaxÞ
½1 ðFMDi=FMDmaxÞmax4.2. Bank depositsRationale behind using this measure is to see how much
banking sector is effective in providing credit, as banking is
most developed sector of financial structure. It is a ratio of
deposit money bank domestic asset to deposit money bank
domestic assets plus central bank domestic assets. Banking
sector is more efficient in provision of services than central
bank. This variable is referred as, BANK, by King and Levine,
so higher values corresponds to more financial services pro-
vided by banks and thus higher levels of financial develop-
ment. Variable is used as interactive term with deficits and thus
for easier interpretation firstly it is normalized through same
process as explained earlier. Variable is taken from database of
World Bank constructed by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine
(2009).4.3. Central bank independenceTo measure independence of central bank different mea-
sures are adopted by empirical studies. Legal and political
independence of central bank is mostly focused by literature.
Economically more independent central bank will be restric-
tive in monetizing fiscal deficits while political independence
assures less involvement of government in appointment and
dismissal of governor of central bank. To measure indepen-
dence of central bank turnover rate of central bank governors,
TOR, is used as proxy of political measurement of indepen-
dence of central bank. Turnover rate is used in many studies
like Cukierman (1992), De Haan and Kooi (2000) etc. More
TOR mean less freedom monetary policy enjoys in following6 See Neyapti (2003), p.463.
Table 1
Correlation matrix of all variables.
Inflation Deficit Money growth rgdpg Exchange rate Def* LBD Def*Lack PVT
sector credit
Def*TOR TOR Pvt sector
credit
Bank
deposit
Inflation 1
Deficit 0.0138 1
Money growth 0.2608 0.0272 1
rgdpg 0.0907 0.2404 0.1248 1
Exchange rate 0.0528 0.1108 0.087 0.0681 1
Def*lack bank deposit 0.397 0.1415 0.3302 0.2049 0.0116 1
Def*lack pvt sector credit 0.4114 0.0999 0.3226 0.2163 0.0313 0.2757 1
Def*TOR 0.065 0.3169 0.0316 0.0997 0.0341 0.0044 0.0141 1
TOR 0.0432 0.0164 0.061 0.1381 0.0513 0.0292 0.0107 0.59 1
Pvt sector credit 0.3949 0.1346 0.3975 0.1802 0.1028 0.3994 0.5262 0.0793 0.0264 1
Bank deposit 0.101 0.4423 0.1159 0.1059 0.0997 0.3504 0.3752 0.18 0.0125 0.4448 1
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dismissal of governors can be observed. Turnover rate data is
extracted from index calculated by Sturm, Jan-Egbert and
Jakob de Haan (2001a, 2001b).
5. Empirical findings
Empirical Models are dynamic in nature and time period is
large enough that requires testing of unit root for selected
variables, as non-stationary variables may produce spurious
results. Results of Fisher test and LLC test are shown in TableTable 2
GMM estimates: dependent variable (inflation rate).
Variables Model 1 Model 2
Inflation(-1) 0.5168*
(8.43)
0.3791*
(5.19)
B.deficit 0.0238***
(1.88)
0.0234**
(2.06)
Rgdpg 0.0202
(0.93)
0.0096
(0.45)
Real exchange 0.4475**
(2.79)
0.3035**
(2.96)
Money growth 0.2258**
(2.05)
Deficit*PVT
Deficit*bank-deposit
Deficit*TOR
Constant 0.1211
(1.05)
0.3449
(1.29)
South Asia dummy 0.1563***
(1.77)
0.1914***
(1.82)
Financial crisis 2007e08 dummy 0.3536***
(1.75)
0.3721***
(1.71)
Sargan test P-value 0.260 0.374
F-test 246.64
0.000
373.16
0.000
AR(1) P-value 0.155 0.127
AR(2) p-value 0.338 0.283
Observations 297 297
NOTES: All values in parenthesis denote t-stat.*, **, *** shows level of significa
Panel regression, 1981e2010, estimated by GMM.A of appendix which shows that null hypothesis is rejected at
5% level of significance and no unit root exists in all variables.
So now we can proceed with the estimation by System GMM
technique. Table 1 shows correlation matrix and it can be
clearly seen that there is positive association of budget deficits
with inflation. Similarly it is also evident that problem of
multi-collinearly is not serious between different variables.
In column 1 of Table 2 basic equation is estimated to check
whether deficits are inflationary or not and it is clearly visible
that deficits are inflationary for selected economies. One
possible reason could be that in sample, most are developingModel 3 Model 4 Model 5
0.4989*
(7.45)
0.3774*
(7.33)
0.3864*
(6.19)
0.0320
(1.00)
0.1631**
(2.86)
0.2899*
(3.70)
0.0159
(0.40)
0.0093
(0.47)
0.0118
(0.60)
0.5802*
(4.37)
0.0474
(1.70)
0.0794**
(2.92)
0.0711*** (1.74) 0.0779***
(1.75)
0.0824**
(1.99)
0.0485**
(3.09)
0.0660*
(4.18)
0.0214**
(2.04)
0.0342***
(1.86)
0.2614**
(2.08)
0.2634***
(1.76)
0.2774
(1.23)
0.1198**
(2.25)
0.2231***
(1.76)
0.2762**
(2.06)
0.2848**
(2.42)
0.1914***
(1.82)
0.3801***
(1.84)
0.3786***
(1.91)
0.3026**
(2.53)
0.349 0.303 0.298
497.43
0.000
524.62
0.000
574.26
0.000
0.145 0.148 0.153
0.314 0.285 0.294
319 297 308
nt at 1, 5 and 10% respectively.
Fig. 1. Governor's TOR and Average Inflation over the Period 1981e2010 in Sample Economies (scatter plot).
7 If TOR is 0.25 or above it shows low level of independence central bank
enjoys (Cukierman, 1992).
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financing fiscal deficits is common norm in these developing
countries. Budget deficits coefficient 0.024 shows that if there
is one unit increase in deficits, price level will raise by 0.02
units, showing positive association of fiscal deficits with
inflation for sample Asian economies. Facts also certify results
as many Asian economies have persistent and sustained fiscal
deficit, like Pakistan and Srilanka. The lag impact of inflation
on current inflation level is significant with coefficient 0.517,
this shows that inflation is dynamic phenomena and previous
level of inflation do affect behavior of individuals in current
period.
Growth rate of real GDP is used as a proxy to capture effect
of business cycle fluctuation on price level. Coefficient shows
positive impact but it is insignificant. Exchange rate is also
important in analyzing the dynamics of inflation. Results show
that coefficient is positive and significant throughout all
models. This reveals that exchange rate fluctuations impact
policies adopted by monetary authority (Mishkin, 2008). This
result gives one interesting insight that exchange rate and
inflation are inter-linked or pass-through impact will be stron-
ger under unstable monetary policy environment. But stable
monetary policy e such institutional setup allows central bank
to pursue its objectives without interference and pressure of
fiscal authority e effectively minimize potential source of
pass-through of exchange rate to domestic prices (Mishkin,
2007; Taylor, 2000). This result indicates that in sample
economies, unstable monetary policy environment prevails and
exchange rate fluctuations exert pressure on price level.
The difference between two regions is captured by dummy
variable which takes value 1 for South Asian countries and
zero for South East Asian countries. Results indicate signifi-
cant difference with expected positive sign. Most of the
models indicate South Asian countries are more inflationary.
Deficits are crucially linked with inflation in these economies
including Pakistan, India, Srilanka, Bangladesh and Nepal. In
these economies political pressure plays important role inextensive public expenditure. Thus in South Asia fiscal deficits
are relatively higher and tax revenue rate is quite low due to
structural and administrative issues. Political and institutional
factors plays important role in high deficits. Low transparency
and high corruption rates further increases fret of economies.
India however has improved its transparency and corruption
index while Pakistan performance has worsened over time on
scale of transparency, accountability and corruption in public
sector World development Indicators (2010).
In column 2, money supply is introduced to check indirect
link of fiscal deficits to inflation and deficits effect becomes
more significant with inclusion of money supply. This confirms
that money supply is a channel that links deficits to inflation and
also supports monetarist school approach. Money growth M2 is
statistically significant for sample economies. Result of model
2 highlights the fact that money creation is noteworthy mean of
deficit financing. In second and third model's estimation, TOR
is used as interactive term with budget deficits to estimate how
dependent central banks affect deficit. Coefficient of TOR*-
deficit is positive with value 0.26 and it is statistically signifi-
cant with t-value 2.08. This shows that when TOR is higher
deficits will be more inflationary. Higher coefficient of TOR
shows that Central bank is not enjoying independence in its real
sense. As TOR is political measure of central bank indepen-
dence, so it signifies that political pressure is greater in selected
Asian economies, and there is frequent dismissal of governors
with change of government or during the tenure of new gov-
ernment. This shows that political agents are very much influ-
ential in business of central bank. Variation in turnover rate of
central bank governors and inflation rate for selected Asian
economies is shown below in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1 shows variation in freedom enjoyed by central banks
in selected economies. For sample countries where turnover
rate is higher7, central bank enjoys low level of independence.
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higher turnover range. Korea is exceptional case where mild
inflation prevails but TOR is also higher. This shows there is
significant variation between inflation level and turnover rate
of governors among selected economies.
After inclusion of TOR as interactive term with budget
deficits, deficit to GDP variable now changes sign and
become negative however it is insignificant. Negative impact
could be either a) multicollinaertiy between TOR*deficits
and deficits, but as already discussed problem of multi-
collinaertiy is not critical or b) selected variables are not
good proxy for CBI; but as per Cukierman (1992), TOR, is
good proxy for developing countries to measure central bank
independence, as legal independence is low in most of
developing countries, or c) due to interaction term; as impact
of fiscal deficits is captured by central bank dependence, it is
safe to say, when institutions are independent and strong
deficits may not directly be correlated to inflation. Price
hikes may be due to external or structural factors. Deficit-
s*TOR shows that deficits have stronger positive impact on
inflation when central bank is not independent from political
pressure. When monetary policy is not independent central
bank adjusts deficits. Financial sector development is
measured with private sector credit to GDP and bank de-
posits. In model 4, two separate interaction terms of deficit
with lack of financial sector development have been intro-
duced. Coefficient values and signs of both interaction terms
are positives and are statistically significant at 5% level ofTable 3
GMM Estimates: Dependent variable (Inflation rate).
Variables Model 1 Model 2
Inflation(-1) 0.4559**
(3.06)
0.3945**
(2.62)
B. deficits 0.0655**
(3.39)
0.0471**
(3.42)
rgdpg 0.0045
(0.82)
0.0049
(0.89)
R. exchange rate 0.0940***
(1.95)
0.0712**
(1.86)
Money growth 0.0721**
(2.29)
Deficit*PVT
Deficit*bank-deposit
Deficit*TOR
Constant 0.6189*
(4.00)
0.4484*
(5.52)
Financial crisis 2007e08 dummy 0.0316***
(1.76)
0.0439
(1.70)
Sargan test P-value 0.189 0.534
F-test 106.83
0.000
303.35
0.000
AR(1) P-value 0.039 0.039
AR(2) P-value 0.546 0.730
Observations 145 145
NOTES: All values in parenthesis denote t-stat.*, **, *** shows level of signific
GMM.significance. It shows that deficits are strongly linked with
inflation as financial development depth is low for sample
economies. One point to ponder is that government is very
much dependent on seigniorage because no other measure is
available and financial intermediation is low. Estimations of
model 3 to 5 present the fact that deficits are inflationary for
sample economies and particularly more inflationary when
central bank independence is low and financial markets are
less developed.
To capture the impact of financial crisis of 2007e08,
dummy variable is introduced in model. Results of estimated
models show that financial crisis intensified inflation rate in
Asian economies. The difference between two regions is
captured by including a dummy, indicating that in South Asian
countries, inflation is severe. Sargen test is used for validity of
instruments employed in estimation process of GMM. All
instruments used to reduce problem of suspected endogeneity
and serial correlation, are valid. All exogenous variables and
higher lags of dependent and independent variables are used as
instruments. The F-test for overall significance of regression
and Arellano-Bond tests AR (1) AR (2) for serial correlation,
are supporting model specification.
As south Asian dummy variable remained significant in all
models so we estimated GMM for selected six Asian econo-
mies presented in Table 3. Coefficients of deficits and money
growth are bigger in magnitude than overall sample. The
deficit variable is significant with coefficient of 0.07 at 5
percent level of significance. If there is one unit increase inModel 3 Model 4 Model 5
0.2878*
(4.87)
0.4466*
(3.15)
0.4559**
(2.88)
0.0091**
(2.08)
0.0197**
(2.19)
0.0410**
(2.78)
0.0033
(1.54)
0.0027
(0.47)
0.0044
(0.76)
* 0.0747**
(2.47)
0.0851**
(2.11)
0.0097**
(2.17)
0.0532*
(5.42)
0.0613**
(2.09)
0.0578***
(1.81)
0.0059**
(2.26)
0.0110**
(2.98)
0.0039**
(2.06)
0.0062*
(4.06)
0.0319***
(1.86)
0.0149**
(2.56)
0.5709*
(5.54)
0.3395*
(4.46)
0.3463*
(3.73)
0.0425***
(1.79)
0.0609***
(1.73)
0.0351***
(1.81)
0.457 0.476 0.560
325.27
0.001
410.76
0.000
232.36
0.000
0.033 0.039 0.032
0.602 0.679 0.707
145 145 145
ant at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Panel regression, 1981e2010, estimated by
Table A
Results of Unit root-test.
Variables Test statistics LLC test Test statistics fisher
Inflation 9.5818 228.6462
Deficit 8.3345 107.7259
Rgdpg 9.6133 227.0069
M2 8.4011 224.9251
Def*Pvt credit 11.6752 116.2301
Def*deposits 8.3413 117.4302
Turnover rate 8.3369 572.9248
Exchange rate 6.3750 64.2643***
Null hypothesis all panels contain unit root.
*** indicates significance is at 5% level.
Table B
Summary statistics.
Variables Obs Mean Std. dev Min Max
Inflation 330 0.722085 0.784563 8.9679 3.88418
Deficits 330 3.398458 3.425382 16.652 4.84354
Growth of M2 330 2.541406 0.800742 1.4716 4.27544
R. exchange rate 330 0.728276 0.389814 0.53635 1.58477
Real GDP growth rate 330 4.936431 3.26972 13.1267 13.2881
Pvt sector credit
to GDP
330 55.43072 50.56078 6.96069 227.753
Bank deposits 330 88.89923 11.81779 43.9535 99.9978
TOR 330 0.245454 0.068755 0.133333 0.36666
Table C
Description and sources of selected variables.
S. no Variable Description
VAR 1 Inflation Annual average rate of change in consumer
prices. Annual series is taken from WDI for
the period 1981e2010.
VAR 2 Deficit Overall deficit as percentage of GDP are taken
for analysis defined as “difference between
total revenue and total expenditure”. Data is
gathered from IFS.
VAR 3 Money supply Growth rate of M2 is taken as measure of
growth of money supply defined as “money
and quasi money comprise the sum of currency
outside banks, demand deposits other than
those of the central government, and the time,
savings, and foreign currency deposits of
resident sectors other than the central
government”. WDI is source of data.
VAR 4 Real GDP growth This variable is included to see how business
cycle fluctuation effects the domestic price
level. Data is taken from world Economic
Outlook.
VAR 5 Private sector
credit to gdp
Private sector credit is used in study to
measure financial sector development.Data is
gathered from WDI.
VAR 6 Bank deposits This indicator is used to measure depth and
degree of the financial sector development.
It is measure as ratio of deposit money bank
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magnitude of deficits to influence inflation is higher. This
result confirms positive association of deficit with inflation and
also presents facts that budget deficits are important de-
terminants of inflation in South Asia as well.
When we compare two regions, it is evident that East Asia
is at much better position in financial integration and inter-
mediation than South Asia. However one interesting and note-
worthy aspect is that there is large variation in development
level of the financial structure for selected sample. As for
some countries, equity market is more developed like in Hong
Kong and Singapore, while Korea and China have voluminous
bond markets, Malaysia have strong bond and equity market
with relation to its GDP. Similarly Thailand's bond market is
also growing. While in South Asia only India has strongest
and vibrant stock market, while other economies for example
Pakistan bond market development is very slow and domestic
bond outstanding is 30% of GDP8. Mainly it consists of
government bonds so there is long way to develop bond
market in Pakistan. Overall model specification test are
satisfied and overall significance of model is also statically
significant.
6. Conclusion
This study investigated role of monetary and financial
institutions in explaining inflationary impact of deficits. A
panel data technique has been to estimate equations by
system GMM for eleven Asian economies for period
1981e2010. Most concerned results are significant as well as
according to the expectations. Results indicate that deficits
are inflationary for sample Asian economies as government
finances its budget deficits mainly through seigniorage.
Secondly, results showed that deficits are more strongly
linked to inflation where institutions are not well established
and not strong enough. When financial markets are fragile,
there is no other option for government to finance its deficits
so they find printing of money as an easy option. Study re-
veals that independence of central bank is very important
when studying relationship between deficits and inflation.
When central bank is not free from political pressure then it
has minimal say in refusing government to monetize deficits.
Political pressure hinders monetary authority to follow her
goals and makes it difficult for central bank to stick to price
stability motive with keen devotion. So whenever deficits are
monetized, they will ultimately lead to increase in price.
Besides always regarding money supply as main culprit,
there is need to have deep analysis of institutions to see how
they play role in aggravating inflationary impact of budget
deficits. Thus this study concludes that institutions are
worthy to consider in explaining deficits and inflation
relationship.8 According to state bank of Pakistan and securities and exchange com-
mission of Pakistan, 2012.Appendix.domestic asset to deposit money bank domestic
asset plus central bank domestic assets. Data
taken from database of IMF constructed by
Beck et al. (2009)
(continued on next page)
Table C (continued )
S. no Variable Description
VAR 7 TOR Central bank Turnover rate of central bank
governors is used as proxy of political
measurement of independence of central bank.
Turnover rate data is extracted from index
that is calculated by Sturm, Jan-Egbert and
Jakob de Haan (2001a, 2001b).
VAR 8 Real Exchange
rate
Defined as a unit of domestic currency relative
to U.S dollar, means higher value is associated
to real exchange rate depreciation and vice
versa. Data taken from Penn world tables 7.0
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